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According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2014,  “Nearly four in 10 Americans say equal 
pay is the top issue facing working women in the United States today, a sentiment shared by 
roughly the same proportions of men, women, and working women” (Jones 2014). As a working 
woman, it is possible that you have experienced the effects of the gender pay gap in your 
lifetime, or at least heard that men are paid more than women. But what does that mean, exactly? 
Do men simply study more and thus make more? Do women naturally select occupations that 
pay less? Do they have more responsibilities inside the home? Or does race play a role? While 
there is great disagreement as to the actual cause of the gender pay gap, researchers have found 
time and time again that this gap, although it has improved over time, continues to exist today.  
Further, many studies have found earnings vary among different racial or ethnic groups, 
with Whites earning substantially more than any other group with the exception of Asians. Day 
and Newburger (2002) report that based on estimates of work-life earnings for these groups, the 
racial pay gap actually widens over the lifetime. Before, the argument made was that minority 
groups such as Blacks and Hispanics simply did not possess as much human capital as higher 
earning Whites. However, research finds that in fact, college attendance rates among minorities 
have increased (Lopez and Fry 2013, U.S. Department of Education 2016). Despite these 
increased rates in college attendance, the earnings gap continues to exist.  
As a country with an increasing rate of women in the workforce (Stalsburg 2016), 
research findings on the pay gap should concern us more. Through my honors project, I will 
explore the persistence of observed gender salary disparity despite substantial gains in 
educational attainment over time by women and how race impacts their earnings.  
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In the following section, I will review the interdisciplinary literature pertaining to the 
gender salary disparity, specifically the roles of race and college education. Using data from the 
National Survey of College Graduates of 2010 (NSCG) and the college-educated as the unit of 
observation, this paper will examine racial earnings differentials after controlling for  
geographical location, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, and 
experience. From these results, we will not only gain a deeper understanding of the how the 
aforementioned factors work together to affect the gender pay gap, but in acquiring that 
knowledge, we will also be better equipped to negotiate our earnings as women in the workplace.  
Research Question 
Despite the fact that today, women constitute the majority of higher education graduates, (U.S. 
Department of Education 2016) they still earn considerably less than their male counterparts. 
Using controls for region, demographics, and human capital development, how does race help to 
explain this pay gap? In other words, how does race affect salary for college educated women?  
Literature Review 
An extensive literature confirms the pay gap observed between men and women (Blau and Kahn 
1999, Solberg 1999, Alkadry and Tower 2006, Erosa et al. 2016, Angelov et al. 2016, Kim 2015, 
Janssen et al. 2016). Using a projection method and assumptions regarding the evolution of 
educational attainment, Michael Shannon and Michael Kidd (2003) first estimate the future 
distribution of skills and use those estimates to predict the size of the future gender wage gap in 
the U.S. They find that although improvement of women’s skills—especially that of educational 
attainment—will result in a continued decrease of the pay gap, the projections suggest that pay 
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convergence will not only take place at a slow rate, but also that a substantial pay gap will 
continue to exist in in the United States even in 2040 (Shannon and Kidd 2002).  
 One factor that may affect the difference in pay across groups of people may be 
educational attainment. Many studies find “a college degree is key to economic opportunity, 
conferring substantially higher earnings on those with credentials than those without” (Carnevale 
et al. 2011). Joanne Lindley and Stephen Machin (2016) find a significant rise in the 
postgraduate wage premium over time, which reflects an increased relative demand due to the 
superior skills sets of these individuals and their occupational status. Carnevale et al. (2011) note 
that the U.S. Census Bureau, in a 2002 study, estimated that in 1999, the average lifetime 
earnings of an individual with a Bachelor’s degree was $2.7 million, a total 75 percent larger 
than that of a high school graduate. According to their report, today’s numbers show similar 
results: since 1999, the college education premium is 84 percent. In other words, the value of a 
college education in terms of future income continues to rise. Further, Tamborini et al. (2015) 
confirm in their study on education and lifetime earnings in the United States, the positive effect 
of higher education on income. Additionally, Baum et al. (2013) from the College Board 
Advocacy and Policy Center explain the benefits of post-secondary education on income. 
According to their report, median earnings of individuals possessing a bachelor’s degree who 
worked full time in 2011 were $56,500, a total $21,100 greater than the median earnings of those 
who only graduated from high school. Moreover, individuals with attended college for some 
time, but did not obtain a degree, still earned 14% more high school graduates working full time 
and year-round. Thus, such results suggest that in analyzing earnings disparities, it might be 
useful to examine the effects of educational attainment.  
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 When race is added to the question of whether or not educational attainment will improve 
economic opportunities, the literature suggests whites and Asians are more likely to earn more 
with more education. Desegregation efforts in the 1970s and 1980s may have led to greater 
educational gains for black children (Pew Research Center), but does that mean that these 
children now the same opportunities as white children? Using U.S. Census and Current 
Population Survey data, Milner finds that while the racial differentials on occupation and 
education were reduced by 1970, the proportion of the occupational gap that was explained by 
educational attainment actually increased. This finding suggests efforts to reduce job 
discrimination played a bigger role in explaining the gap than efforts to desegregate schools to 
help increase educational attainment levels among black children (Milner 1973). More recently, 
in a Pew Research Center report, researchers found the high school graduation gap between 
blacks and whites has significantly decreased, with the percentage of whites in of U.S. 
population age 25 and older with a high school diploma at 93 and that of blacks at 88. Asians had 
a high school diploma attainment of 89% and Hispanics 67%. Similarly, they found whites are 
more likely to have a college degree at 36% of U.S. population age 25 and older (holding at least 
a bachelor’s degree) than blacks at 23%, although this gap was much wider. Hispanics are even 
less likely to have at least a bachelor’s degree at a mere 15% of the U.S. population age 25 and 
older, while Asians are the most likely at 53% (Pew Research Center 2016). Thus, while whites 
are the most likely to graduate high school, Asians are the most likely to graduate college. In 
terms of economic opportunities, the Pew Research Center finds that the median adjusted 
household income in 2014 dollars was highest for Asians at $77,900, followed by whites at 
$71,300, and blacks and Hispanics at a low $43,300; a gap which has actually widened over time 
(2016). These findings suggest that while the racial gaps in terms of educational attainment have 
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decreased over time, the racial earnings gap continues to exist, suggesting other factors may be 
playing a role.  
Much of the literature also supports the idea that human capital development has positive 
effects on earnings (Willis 1986, Weiss 1995, Blundell et al. 1999, Gabriel and Schmitz 2015). 
As explained by Danice Lynn Langdon and Roger Klomegah (2013), “human capital differences 
are the time and investment that an individual puts into education and work force.” In the 1960s 
and 1970s, different economists including Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) 
expanded on this idea of “human capital” to include “education, training, work, experience, and 
even expenditure on health care” as means for increasing the productivity of workers, which is in 
effect, an investment in human capital (Olson 2012). In other words, human capital theory relies 
on the idea that the resources we, or others spend to help refine our knowledge and skillset is an 
investment in the capital we provide as individuals to our employer. Investment in human capital 
development then, helps increase our earnings.  
Further, many researchers argue that human capital development signals explanations of 
earnings. Andrew Weiss (1995) explores this idea in his research and finds that while human 
capital development is important in explaining earnings, it also serves as an important signal to 
employers. As he describes it, “better educated workers are not a random sample of workers: 
they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent, are less likely to smoke, drink or use illicit 
drugs, and are generally healthier (Weiss 1995). In other words, the fact that workers obtain an 
education signals to employers they are already better prepared for the workplace. These are then 
the individuals a firm wants to employ as by hiring them, firms may experience lower turnover 
and higher productivity as opposed to hiring non-educated individuals. Thus, human capital 
development serves as a signal of personality and character traits that may prove beneficial to a 
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firm. Further, given that many economists argue that one of the ways in which wages are 
determined is through the productivity of workers (Case and Fair 2004), then investment in 
human capital can thus serve to help explain wages (Olson 2012), or more generally, earnings.  
Weiss’ finding that human capital development signals explanations of earnings supports 
the statistical discrimination model, as proposed by economists Edmund S. Phelps (1972) and 
Kenneth Arrow (1973). As defined by England and Lewin, statistical discrimination occurs 
“when decisions are made on the basis of race or sex group averages on indicators of 
productivity” (1989). Rather than employers simply having a personal prejudice or distaste for a 
particular group, the idea here is that discrimination takes place because employers face limited 
information about job applicants. As such, it is simple to use observable characteristics that act 
as “indicators” to infer or signal an individual’s relevant skills and productivity level. Such 
indicators may include gender, race, and quantity of education. The employer, a profit-
maximizer, will thus “…discriminate against blacks or women if he believes them to be less 
qualified, reliable, long-term, etc. on average than whites and men, respectively, and if the cost 
of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive,” for example (1972). Phelps 
explains that the employer’s belief that an individual from group A is preferable to one from 
group B, for example, may stem from previous statistical exposure to the two groups, where 
most of the time, individuals from group A are hired over those from group B or are hired in 
more favorable terms. Alternatively, the employer’s belief may stem from sociological beliefs 
about particular groups, one example being the belief that blacks and women simply grow up 
more disadvantaged because of racial hostility and/or prejudice they experience in society 
(Phelps 1972). Supposing that the group average for blacks is in fact lower than that of whites in 
terms of productivity, Arrow argues that because the cause of such a statistic is unobservable,
 1
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“then the experience of employers over time will cause them to use the observable characteristic, 
race, as a surrogate for the unobservable characteristics which in fact cause the productivity 
differences” (1998). Thus, similar to Phelps, Arrow believes that experience with particular 
groups helps shape employers’ opinions and beliefs about those groups, and leads them to make 
decisions based on that experience.  Nonetheless, the result is that individuals from non-preferred 
groups undergo discrimination. Further, discrimination in this way can be self-reinforcing in that 
when individuals of the non-preferred group realize that they are not preferred and are 
discriminated against, they will not want to participate in the market and/or will not choose to 
invest in human capital because they believe it will not make a difference in terms of being hired 
(Arrow 1998). As such, it is possible that the once observed characteristics by employers of the 
non-preferred group become reality rather remain a mere observation.  
 Another important aspect in terms of explaining the pay gap then, is racial discrimination. 
One very popular sociological theory of discrimination is known as the social identity theory. 
Fathered by Tajfel and Turner, this theory recognizes that humans long for a sense of belonging, 
defining our social identity as our sense of who we are based on the social group(s) of which we 
are members (1979). The theory posits that members of a group are “motivated to protect their 
self-esteem and achieve a positive and distinct social identity” (Al Ramiah et al. 2010). This 
desire to protect one’s group identity may lead to discrimination as we are filled with pride for 
our group and consequently, we may attempt to minimize any group to which we do not belong 
or, alternatively, we may give preferential treatment to those with whom we share group 
membership. This desire results in an “us versus them” mentality, where we seek to raise the 
status of our group and minimize that of other groups (Al Ramiah et al. 2010).  In terms of 
employer discrimination then, this theory might manifest if, for example, a male employer feels 
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strongly about his social identity as a man and as such, chooses to hire a male employee over a 
female or a black individual simply because they share a group identity (both the employer and 
the employee are male). The result is discrimination toward the out group—in this case, the 
black and female individuals. Using data from the MultiCity Study of Urban Inequality and the 
Multi-City Telephone Employer Survey, Julie A. Kmec (2002) studies this effect. She finds the 
data support the idea of race-based devaluation. In fact, employers pay whites and minorities in 
mostly black or Latino jobs smaller wages and provide them with fewer benefits than their peers 
in mostly white jobs, net of controls. Further, she finds that employers hire based on race and/or 
gender traits they share with applicants (Kmec 2002). In other words, white employers hire more 
white employees because they share the same race, and male employers hire more male 
employees because they share the same gender—a finding that supports the social identity theory 
on discrimination. In other words, employers have certain preferences for groups that affect the 
way in which they hire and that may result in negative effects in terms of earnings if that worker 
is in the non-preferred group.  
Kmec’s findings may also be explained in part by Gary Becker’s Taste Discrimination 
Model, an economic theory that depicts discrimination as a personal prejudice—or taste—against 
associating with a particular group of individuals. Having a “taste for discrimination” implies 
that the discriminator is willing to pay a price to discriminate against a particular group (England 
and Lewin 1989). According to the model, there are three sources of discrimination: the 
employer, the employee (coworker), and the customer, however, for the purposes of this paper, 
we will focus on the employer. In maximizing his utility, an employer may choose to forgo 
profits in order to avoid associating himself with groups for which he has distaste. I will provide 
an example to better explain the theory. Suppose an employer prefers to associate himself with 
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neither women nor minorities and instead has a preference, or taste, for hiring white men. 
Suppose further, for the purposes of explaining the model, these women and minorities are just 
as productive as white men. Given the employer’s preference for hiring white men and the 
choice between the three groups, he will act as if the non-preferred groups (in this case women 
and minorities) are less productive than the preferred group (white men), despite equal 
productivity between the three groups. Thus, the employer’s devaluation of the productivity of 
the non-preferred groups is strictly subjective and is therefore a demonstration of personal 
prejudice (Ehrenberg and Smith 2012).  
In order to affect earnings, these preferences or tastes for particular groups must influence 
employers’ actions in hiring. In order to affect earnings on a larger scale then, these preferences 
or tastes for particular groups must apply on a large scale—for the purposes of my paper, this 
means many firms must have distastes for minorities and women and thus discrimination takes 
place. Ultimately, the result is that the employer pays for his distaste of the non-preferred group, 
a cost that is denoted by the negative discrimination coefficient “d,” which measures the strength 
of his distaste. The cost to him of employing an individual from a non-preferred group is thus 
𝑤𝑛𝑝 + 𝑑, where w is wage and the subscript “np” stands for the non-preferred group and “d” is a 
negative number. Further, the discriminating employer ends up hiring the individual from the 
non-preferred group at a lower wage than that of the preferred group, despite having equal 
productivity, effectively discriminating against the non-preferred individual.  (Borjas 2016). This 
result is depicted in the equation 𝑤𝑛𝑝 = 𝑤𝑝 − 𝑑 > 𝑤𝑝, where the subscript “p” stands for the 
preferred group. Keeping in mind that the discrimination coefficient is negative, given this 
example then, the outcome is that wage of the preferred white male is higher than those of the 
non-preferred minorities and women. As England and Lewin explain, an employer with a 
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distaste for women, for example, is “unwilling to hire [women] unless they offer themselves at a 
wage far enough below the wage paid white [males] to completely offset the disutility she or he 
experiences by employing [women]” (1989). Consequently, the wage gap widens with the 
discriminatory preferences of employers between the preferred group and the non-preferred 
group(s).
 2
   
To gain a better understanding of why discrimination occurs, we can also examine other 
socio-psychological views on discrimination. It is important to note that discrimination from a 
sociological standpoint deviates a little from the economics definition. As defined by Correll et 
al., discrimination is “behaviour directed towards category members that is consequential for 
their outcomes and that is directed towards them not because of any particular deservingness or 
reciprocity, but simply because they happen to be members” (2010). Another commonly cited 
theory of discrimination in the sociological world is aversive racism. The idea here is that rather 
than professing their racism and/or prejudices openly, individuals do so in a quiet manner, 
typically by choosing to not interact with those individuals towards which they feel prejudiced. 
Often times, these individuals actually profess egalitarian values in front of others, despite inner 
prejudice toward particular groups (Al Ramiah et al. 2010). As Al Ramiah et al. explain, “people 
generally will not discriminate in situations in which right and wrong is clearly defined; 
discrimination would be obvious to others and to oneself, and aversive racists do not want to 
appear or be discriminatory” (2010). The end result, nonetheless, is discrimination. In terms of 
employer discrimination, this theory would suggest that while employers may seem to uphold 
egalitarian values on the outside—a good example might be a company that state it is an “equal 
opportunity employer”—the reality is that he does feel prejudiced against some groups, but 
because he is racist averse, will tend to be more discreet about it. Perhaps he will choose not to 
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hire an individual from a group he feels prejudiced towards, but rather than stating that it is a 
matter of race, for example, will say that he does not possess the skills and/or experience 
required for the job—a reason that tends to be more accepted as it is not typically associated with 
discrimination.  
Ultimately then, economics tells us that while those who are discriminated against suffer 
lower earnings than their marginal productivity of labor, employers also suffer the consequence 
their discrimination by paying a discrimination coefficient, thus lowering their profits. This 
theory then suggests firms that do not discriminate will fare better in terms of profitability.  
Sociology, on the other hand, works with economic theories of discrimination to help us to 
understand why employers might discriminate against their employees, thus providing a better 
understanding of how earnings might be affected by gender and race.  
Theory  
Based on the literature review and the various theories of discrimination, race should play a role 
in the gender pay gap. The logic here is that employers discriminate whether intentionally or 
unintentionally by basing decisions involving their employees on tastes and/or personal 
prejudices towards particular groups, lack of information, or their strong connection to their own 
group identity. For the purposes of this project, discrimination will be defined as a minority 
group of individuals being treated in a less favorable manner—based on an observable 
characteristic—than the majority group, despite both groups having equal levels of productivity.  
Employers may have a particular taste for a certain group, or distaste based on preconceived 
notions about that group. Because there is no absolute way to measure productivity, in many 
cases he or she may rely on “indicators” to infer about an applicant’s relevant skills and work 
ethic. He or she may prefer a particular group because he or she shares a social identity with that 
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group and feels a strong connection with that individual, thus choosing to hire him or her over an 
individual with whom he or she does not share a social identity. Regardless of the reasoning and 
intention or lack of intention, the result is discrimination against some group. Generally 
speaking, the literature suggests there are three groups who “win” in terms of highest earnings. 
Those three groups are males, whites, and Asians. These findings imply that women are 
absolutely at a disadvantage because of their gender, as are most minorities, including blacks and 
Hispanics. While educational attainment and investment in human capital development may help 
to narrow this gender and racial earnings disparity, the literature suggests the disparity continues 
to exist.  
Hypotheses 
Given this theory and the previous literature, one would expect to see a few different results. 
First, one would expect the effects of the variables encompassing human capital are positive. In 
other words, the greater the levels of degree attainment, work experience (years since highest 
attained degree), and firm specific skills (current job tenure), the larger the salary of the 
individual, as the literature states. Further, despite increasing levels of investment in human 
capital development, one would expect that women continue to earn less than men. Additionally, 
one would expect that race plays an important role in the determining of salaries. As the 
literature tells us, whites and Asians tend to earn more than other minorities despite increasing 
levels of educational attainment among those minorities, suggesting discrimination may be 
occurring in the workplace. Thus, one would expect that regardless of gender, whites and Asians 
will earn more, while blacks and Hispanics will earn less.    
H1: An increase in human capital development should result in a larger salary. 
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H2: Women should have lower salaries than their male colleagues. 
H3: Asians should have similar comparable salaries to their white colleagues. 
H4: Blacks and Hispanics should have lower salaries than their white and Asian 
colleagues.  
Method for Research 
The National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) is a biennial survey sponsored by the 
National Science Foundation that provides data on different characteristics of college graduates 
under the age of 76 living in the United States. The 2010 NSCG sampled approximately 135,000 
random individuals who had obtained at least an associate’s degree at the time of taking the 
survey. For the purposes of this study, I will include only full-time individuals who have all the 
data for the analysis. The sample size then becomes 55,421.
3
 Using this data, I will estimate a 
series of OLS regressions on individual and job-related characteristics to determine the role of 
race in the persistence of the gender pay gap. Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations 
of the variables.  
 In addition to controlling for gender, where male is the omitted variable, the final dataset 
used for this analysis includes controls for different factors that affect salaries including 
geographical location (where New England is the omitted variable), social demographics, human 
capital development, and occupation. Human capital development is controlled for through 
variables representing the individual education and employment circumstances of those 
surveyed. Variables representing the highest degree obtained by an individual (i.e. master’s, 
PhD, or professional degree) capture the educational effect, where a bachelor’s degree is the 
omitted category. In terms of employment, variables include years since attainment of highest 
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degree and tenure with current employer. The occupation controls include fifteen different 
occupational categories, where a kindergarten through 12
th
 grade teaching job is the omitted 
category.  The notes under part I of the Appendix provide a detailed description of each 
occupation category used in this analysis.  
 Using this data, I will use the traditional semi-log functional form for salary regression to 
determine their effects on women’s salaries by race. First, I will run an initial regression with 
only geographical location (region) as a control. I will then run a second regression controlling 
for social demographics (marital status and number of children).
4
 The third regression will 
control for human capital (degree attainment, work experience, and firm specific skills—current 
job tenure) while the fourth regression will control for occupation. Additionally, I will run a final 
regression to check for possible interactive effects with gender. The full regression equation is 
written as: ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙) = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝑗 ∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗
𝑗
𝑖=1 +
𝛽𝑙 ∑ ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑙
𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝑚 ∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚
𝑚
𝑖=𝑚 + 𝛽𝑛 ∑ 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑛 , with interactions 
between some of these variables and gender in a final model. Ultimately, by setting up the 
regressions in this manner, we will be able to see how each set of controls helps to further 
explain discrepancies in earnings by gender and race. 
One of the assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) known as 
“homoskedasticity” is that the variance of the error terms is constant for each observation 
(Woolridge 2012). Because the error variance measures model uncertainty, this assumption 
implies that the model uncertainty is same for all observations. When this assumption fails, then 
the model is likely to have a heteroskedasticity problem. To ensure that the error terms are 
constant for each observation, I will test for heteroskedasticity in my models using the Breusch-
Pagan and White tests. From these tests, I will be able to conclude whether a heteroskedasticity 
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problem is present and will proceed to correct it. One of the commonly used methods to correct 
for heteroskedasticity is through the use of robust standard errors. This correction involves 
producing consistent estimators of the standard errors (Woolridge 2012). The idea here is to 
create constant variance across observations and thus arrive at homoskedasticity in order to 
appropriately conduct t and F tests.  
 Finally, in conducting research, it is always important to recognize limitations. For the 
purposes of my honors project, it is important to recognize that, as Olson (2013) explains, human 
capital theory, although useful in understanding the gender pay gap, does not provide measures 
that are “totally a matter of free choice unaffected by social norms.” In other words, there are 
other factors beyond economics that may influence earnings; there may be social factors 
involved of which we are unaware. While this study will look at some important factors that play 
a role in earnings such as occupation, region, human capital development and social 
demographics such as marital status and number of children, it is not all encompassing.  
Results 
This study finds that controlling for region explains about 7.1 percent of the variation in salary 
for the college-educated. Table 2 reports the log-linear salary regressions. Column 2 provides the 
basic regression with controls for the regions of New England, Atlantic, Central, Mountain, and 
Pacific, where New England is the omitted variable. Given this these controls, females earn an 
average salary of 38.2 percent less than males, supporting my second hypothesis that women 
should earn less than males. Additionally, blacks earn an average salary of 7.0 percent and 
Hispanics 12.2 percent less than whites, supporting my fourth hypothesis that blacks and 
Hispanics earn less than their white counterparts. In terms of Asians, controlling for region, the 
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result is that Asians earn an average salary 4.6 percent larger than whites, supporting my third 
hypothesis that Asians and whites have similar salaries, although 4.6% is larger than I imagined.  
 Further, controlling for the social demographics of marital status and number of kids only 
adds about 1.5 percent explanatory power to the estimation of these college educated individuals’ 
salaries, while the addition of human capital development controls almost doubles its 
explanatory power at 15.9 percent.  As can be seen in the second column of Table 2, adding 
marital status and number of kids reduces the female coefficient by only two percentage points. 
These controls do cut the black coefficient by about 3 percentage points to 4.6, but does very 
little to the coefficients on Asian and Hispanic. As can be seen in the third column of Table 2, 
when adding human capital development controls, the coefficient on female is reduced to 35.4 
percent while the coefficient on Asian increases by about one percent at 5.5 and the coefficient 
on Hispanic decreases to 7 percent. These results suggest that investment in human capital 
development may be a worthwhile endeavor, especially for Hispanics, whose average salary rises 
by about five percent when accounting for human capital development. Similarly, when 
controlling only for only marital status, number of kids, and region, the result is an increase in 
the average salary for blacks by about 3 percent. Adding controls for human capital development 
to the model reduces the coefficient on black decreases to a mere 0.8 percent, although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, suggesting white and black salaries are not different 
once human capital is included in the model. Further, these results suggest that Hispanic and 
black minorities can gain from obtaining higher levels of education. They reflect the results 
Cheeseman Day and Newburger, who found that both black and Hispanic work-life earnings 
increase with higher educational attainment although at a higher rate for blacks than for 
Hispanics using data from the U.S. Census (2002). Because the coefficients on race are 
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statistically significant with the exception of the coefficient on black in the third model, these 
results suggest that human capital definitely affects the earning potentials of individuals by race.  
 Controlling for occupation adds even greater explanatory power to the estimation of 
salaries for these college-educated individuals at 27.4 percent. Most of the coefficients on the 
occupational categories are statistically significant, suggesting that occupation plays a major role 
in the earnings of individuals by race and gender. Further, in conducting a restricted F-test to 
determine if occupation jointly matters to the model, the result is that occupation should be 
included, as it adds to the model. Of all the occupations, the only category not statistically 
significant is that of social occupations.
5
 Some of the best paid individuals are those in 
engineering, management and business, and the hard sciences with average earnings greater than 
those of k-12 teachers by 57.8, 50.6, and 42.8 percent, respectively. 
Finally, the interactions model as can be seen in column 5 of Table 2, tests for gender 
differences on any variables interacted with female. Incorporating these interactions with all 
controls explains about 28.08 percent of the salary discrepancy between men and women. Given 
the literature review and theory which tells us that men earn more than women, one should 
expect that the coefficient on the salary of men be positive. The results support this information. 
On average, when all other variables equal zero, the predicted value of natural log of salary for 
white men is a positive 10.272. In dollar terms, this means that on average, all other variables set 
equal to zero, white men earn a salary of about $25,058.13.
6
 This result further supports the 
literature and media reporting white men are the top earners. As suggested by the literature, 
Asian men earn comparable salaries to white men, with an average only 2.3 percent lower than 
white men. Hispanic men follow with an average salary 7.3 percent lower than that of white men 
with black men following closely behind at 8.7 percent.  
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Conversely, one would expect that the coefficients on the earnings of women be negative. 
As expected, Asian women earn an average salary 26.5 percent lower than white men—a 
differential comparable to that of white women. Interestingly, white women fall behind Hispanic 
women—although only slightly—earning a lower average salary of 33.3 percent compared to the 
Hispanic woman’s 32.3 percent when compared to white men. More importantly, the data show 
that black women earn an average salary that is 22.4 percent lower than white males, making 
them the top female earners, even greater than Asian and white women (when compared to white 
men). This finding therefore suggests that black women have the most to gain from further 
educational attainment, a result supporting the findings of others that educated black women are 
surpassing educated white women in terms of earnings (“It’s the Strong Academic Performance” 
2001).  
 In interacting with gender, we see some interesting results for some of the variables. In 
terms of kids, men can have up to four children before return begins to decline, as can be seen in 
Figure 1. In contrast, women face a declining return to children after the first one. In other 
words, men gain in terms of salary by having more children (up to four) while women lose by 
having even just one. Regarding degree attainment, we can see in Figures 2, 3, and 4 that 
although men earn more, women can narrow the gap by pursuing a Master’s degree, and even 
further by pursing a PhD or a professional degree such as a JD (law) and a MD (medicine). In 
interacting gender with current job tenure, we see that the returns to men are rising with another 
year of tenure until reaching their peak at 41 years of tenure, where returns begin to decline. 
Similarly, women face increasing returns with each additional year of tenure, however, their 
peak is at 26 years. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.  
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To ensure that the error terms were constant for each observation, I tested for 
heteroskedasticity. The results for the two tests I used, the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests, 
can be seen Table 4. Using both of these tests, I was able to reject the null and conclude that I 
had a heteroskedasticity problem. In order to correct for it, I used robust standard errors, which 
are commonly used to correct for heteroskedasticity (Woolridge 2012).  
Conclusion 
This paper examines some of the different factors that affect salary differentials by race and 
gender. By estimating a series of OLS regressions through levels of controls, we are able to see 
how different controls including geographic location, social demographics, human capital 
development and occupation work together to explain these differences in pay. On their own, 
marital status and number of kids (social demographic controls) do very little to explain 
discrepancies in pay by race and gender. Men are paid more than women across all races and 
white men are the top earners. As expected, Asians are near the top in terms of salary for both 
genders with Hispanics falling behind. The inclusion of human capital development controls 
almost doubles the explanatory power of the model. This finding suggests that my hypothesis 
that an increase in human capital development should result in a higher salary is correct, thus 
making it a worthwhile investment for all individuals—regardless of gender or race. After 
controlling for occupation—which adds significant explanatory power to the model—and 
interacting race, I find that white women make an average wage 33.3 percent lower than white 
men, while that same differential is only 22.4 percent for black women. This finding suggests 
that black women have the most to gain from investing in their human capital development. As 
such, black women should definitely pursue higher levels of educational attainment as well as 
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experience in the workplace. In this way, they can continue to work towards narrowing the gap 
between men and women as well as across races.  
 Given more time and unlimited resources, I would definitely analyze a few different 
aspects in ascertaining exactly what factors affect these salary differentials. In terms of the 
impact on women, I would like to see if there are any important interactions between gender and 
working in a particular occupation. News articles often cite women choosing to work in 
occupations that pay less as one of the reasons for the gender pay gap. It would thus be 
interesting to test whether this statement true, especially in regards to college-educated 
individuals like me. Further, I would like to investigate how fringe benefits—benefits that 
supplement an individual’s salary such as a company car, health insurance, and/or vacation 
pay—impact the gender and racial pay gap. According to a study conducted by Solberg and 
Laughlin that includes a comprehensive measure of compensation for men and women, the 
inclusion of fringe benefits leads to a reduction in the gap from 12.6 to 3.6 percent (1995). It 
would be interesting to see how this additional compensation would factor in for college-
educated individuals in explaining the differences in salaries across gender and race. Finally, I 
would also perform a Oaxaca decomposition, which decomposes outcome variables into 
explained and unexplained variation (Oaxaca 1973). In the case of salary, examples of explained 
variation could include level of educational attainment and current job tenure, unexplained 
variation may include discrimination. In this way, one could more accurately determine the 
nature of the gender and racial salary differentials. As working women, the hope is that this 
research and any further research conducted on gender and racial salary differentials serve to 
better inform us on our opportunities or lack thereof as we walk into the workforce and fight for 
what is not only fair, but also just—equality.  
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Appendix 
I. Information on Categories of Occupations: 
 
 Scientists (Hard Science): Computer Science, Mathematics, Biology, Physical Science  
 Engineers: All Engineers.   
 Doctors and Lawyers: MDs, Attorneys, Judges.  
 All Other Health Occupations: Nurses, Pharmacists, Dieticians, Health Technicians, 
All other Health Occupations.  
 Social Scientists: Economists, Political Scientists, Psychologists, Sociologists, 
Anthropologists. 
 Social Services: All other social scientists, Social Workers, Counselors. 
 K-12 Teachers: All teachers in K-12 system. 
 University Professors: All individual teaching at the university level. 
 Management and Business Professionals: Top and Mid-Managers in public, private, 
nonprofit industries, Accountants and Auditors, Personnel and Training Specialists, Sales 
in insurance, securities, commodities, retail.  
 Creative/History: Artists, Editors, Entertainers, Public Relations, Historians, Librarians, 
Archivists, and Curators. 
 Technical: Technicians in all industries, Architects, Actuaries, Drafting Technicians, 
Surveyors, Computer Programmers. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
       Full Sample      Male   Female 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  
        
 Ln(salary) 11.00136 0.759799 11.16623 0.6718709 10.78035 0.8128795 
 1 if black=1 0.0953096 0.293645 0.0742146 0.2621239 0.123586 0.3291156 
 Female =1 0.4272732 0.494687 1 0 1 0 
 1 if black=1 x 
female=1 
0.052805 0.223646 0.0742146 0.2621239 0.123586 0.3291156 
 1 if Hispanic =1 0.1045962 0.306035 0.0965295 0.2953207 0.1154091 0.3195217 
 1 if Hispanic=1 x 
female=1 
0.0493112 0.216519 0.0965295 0.2953207 0.1154091 0.3195217 
 1 if Asian=1 0.1670136 0.372991 0.1752639   0.3801987 0.1559548 0.3628201 
 1 if Asian=1 x 
female=1 
0.0666353 0.249392 0.1752639   0.3801987 0.1559548 0.3628201 
 Number of kids 0.7996597 1.074184 0.8577976 1.113118   0.7217303   1.014477 
 Number of kids
2 
1.793306 3.673288 1.974809 3.902852 1.550015   3.325502 
 Female=1 x total 
number of kids 
0.308376 0.753123 0.8577976 1.113118 0.7217303   1.014477 
 Female=1 x total 
number of kids
2
 
0.6622798 2.305 1.974809 3.902852 1.550015 3.325502 
 Highest Degree is MA 0.3433319 0.474825 0.3163285 0.4650501 0.379528 0.4852798 
 Highest degree=MA=1 
x female=1 
0.1621622 0.368603 0.3163285 0.4650501 0.379528 0.4852798 
 Highest Degree is PhD 0.0663275 0.248856 0.0715595   0.2577612 0.0593145 0.2362174   
 Highest degree=PhD=1 
x female=1 
0.0253435 0.157168 0.0715595   0.2577612 0.0593145 0.2362174   
 Highest Degree is 
Professional 
0.0599012 0.237306 0.0601176 0.2377083 0.0596111 0.2367699   
 Highest 
degree=Professional 
=1 x female=1 
0.0254702 0.15755 0.0601176 0.2377083 0.0596111 0.2367699   
 Years since Highest 
Degree
 
16.91628 11.14717 18.08367 11.2805 15.35148 10.76944 
 Years since Highest 
Degree
2 
410.4176 451.0708 454.2647 467.601   351.6438 420.816 
 Current Job Tenure 8.304375 7.993929 8.804981 8.3752 7.633352 7.399569 
 Current Job Tenure
2
 132.8644 248.3572 147.6694 267.5627 113.0194 218.4367 
 Female=1 x current job 
tenure 
3.261527 6.136226 8.804981 8.3752   7.633352 7.399569 
 Female=1 x current job 
tenure
2
 
48.29015 153.3379 147.6694 267.5627 113.0194 218.4367 
 Region       
 2 0.335566 0.472192 0.32265 0.4674975   0.3528789 0.4778756 
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 3 0.3430242 0.474724 0.3529932 0.4779082 0.3296615 0.4701002   
 4 0.0639018 0.24458 0.0677982 0.2514033 0.058679 0.2350279 
 5 0.1950725 0.39626 0.1943865   0.3957339 0.195992 0.3969708 
 Married 0.7519053 0.431911 0.7998925 0.4000869   0.6875821 0.463489 
 Scientist 0.1732409 0.378459 0.1985903 0.3989451 0.139262 0.346227 
 Engineer 0.2248873 0.417512 0.2407232   0.4275293 0.2036606 0.402728 
 Doctor 0.0201481 0.140508 0.0205765 0.141964 0.0195738 0.1385333 
 Health Job 0.0659112 0.248129 0.0218724 0.1462693 0.1249417 0.3306599 
 Technical Job 0.153835 0.360794 0.1451419 0.3522494 0.1654874 0.3716278 
 Social Job 0.0299415 0.170428 0.0152665 0.1226127 0.0496123 0.2171473   
 University Professor 0.0562083 0.230326 0.0490549 0.2159862 0.0657967 0.2479317 
 Management/Business 0.2634999 0.440535 0.2887667 0.4531964 0.2296318 0.420605 
 Creative Job 0.0139208 0.117164 0.0093558 0.0962736 0.0200398 0.1401394 
 Secretary 0.0291088 0.168113 0.0128643 0.1126907 0.0508834 0.2197642 
 Service 0.0257055 0.158257 0.0234212 0.1512395 0.0287675 0.167156 
 Social Scientist 0.0239677 0.15295 0.0170049 0.1292913 0.0333009 0.1794248 
 Manual Labor 0.023316 0.150907 0.0294582 0.1690898 0.0150828 0.1218851 
 Law 0.0277511 0.16426 0.0270561   0.1622494 0.0286828 0.166917 
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Table 2: Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Basic 
Regression 
Married 
and Kids 
Married, Kids, & 
Human Capital 
Married, Kids, 
Human 
Capital, and 
Occupation 
Interactions 
Female -0.382
***
 -0.363
***
 -0.354
***
 -0.236
***
 -0.333
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) 
Black -0.070
***
 -0.041
***
 -0.008 0.015 -0.087
***
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Asian 0.046
***
 0.040
***
 0.055
***
 0.011 -0.023
**
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Hispanic -0.122
***
 -0.116
***
 -0.070
***
 -0.037
***
 -0.071
***
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Married  0.145
***
 0.085
***
 0.062
***
 0.065
***
 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Total Number of Kids  0.085
***
 0.045
***
 0.036
***
 0.090
***
 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Total Number of Kids
2
   -0.014
***
 -0.009
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.013
***
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Highest Degree is MA   0.174
***
 0.195
***
 0.155
***
 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Highest Degree is PhD   0.320
***
 0.461
***
 0.397
***
 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Highest Degree is Professional   0.451
*** 
(0.013) 
0.362
*** 
(0.022) 
0.318
*** 
(0.023) 
Years since Highest Degree   0.040
***
 0.035
***
 0.035
***
 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years since Highest Degree
2 
  -0.001
***
 -0.001
***
 -0.001
***
 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current Job Tenure   0.022
***
 0.025
***
 0.017
***
 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Current Job Tenure
2 
  -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 -0.000
***
 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control for Region 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Occupation 
 
No No No Yes Yes 
1 if black=1 x female=1     0.195
***
 
     (0.019) 
1 if Hispanic=1 X female=1     0.081
***
 
     (0.019) 
1 if Asian=1 X female=1     0.091
***
 
     (0.016) 
Female=1 x total number of 
kids 
    -0.120
***
 
     (0.013) 
Female=1 x total number of 
kids
2 
    0.010
*
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     (0.004) 
Highest degree=MA=1 x 
female=1 
    0.092
***
 
     (0.013) 
Highest degree=PhD=1 x 
female=1 
    0.162
***
 
     (0.022) 
Highest degree=Professional=1 
x female=1 
    0.110
***
 
     (0.025) 
Female=1 x current job tenure     0.017
***
 
     (0.002) 
Female=1 x current job 
tenure
2 
    -0.000
***
 
     (0.000) 
Constant 11.216
***
 11.053
***
 10.553
***
 10.226
***
 10.272
***
 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) 
r2 0.071 0.085 0.159 0.274 0.281 
N 55241.000 55241.000 55241.000 55241.000 55241.000 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Data Source: National Survey of College Graduates, 2010 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
All models control for region while models (4) and (5) control for occupation. 
Chi
2 
was 3675.80.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Differentials by Race and Gender 
 White Female Black Female Hispanic Female Asian Female 
White Male -0.333 -0.224 -0.323 -0.265 
White Female N/A 0.108 0.010 0.068 
Black Male 0.246 -0.139 -0.236 -0.178 
Black Female -0.108 N/A -0.098 -0.040 
Hispanic Male -0.262 -0.154 -0.252 -0.194 
Hispanic Female -0.010 0.098 N/A 0.058 
Asian Male -0.310 -0.202 -0.300 -0.242 
Asian Female -0.068 0.040 -0.058 N/A 
 
Note: Using the coefficients, I estimated the differentials by race and gender, holding all other variables constant. 
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Table 4: Testing for Heteroskedasticity 
Test Chi-Square Statistic P-value 
Breusch-Pagan 3647.17 0.000 
White 2879.90 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
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Endnotes 
1
 Arrow suggests some of the causes of this difference in productivity may include quality of 
education or cultural differences; however, the cause itself is unobservable. 
2 
Here μ is normally distributed with a mean equal to zero.  
3 Once all individuals not relevant to this analysis are removed, those with an associate’s degree 
disappear well.  
 
4 
Squared terms for time-related variables (years since highest degree and current job tenure) are 
included to capture the nonlinear relationship of experience to salary. 
 
5
 Details of the occupational coefficients are available from the author on request. 
 
6 
This salary (in dollar terms) is found by taking the antilog of the coefficient on the constant. In 
this case, I took the antilog of this coefficient to obtain a rough estimate in dollar terms to make 
it easier for the reader to understand the result.  
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